

SECURITY AUDIT REPORT

Hatom ush-minter MultiversX smart contract

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Disclaimer

The report makes no statements or warranties, either expressed or implied, regarding the security of the code, the information herein or its usage. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility, safety and bugfree status of the code, or any other statements.

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Terminology

Code: The code with which users interact.

Inherent risk: A risk for users that comes from a behavior inherent to the code's design.

Inherent risks only represent the risks inherent to the code's design, which are a subset of all the possible risks. **No inherent risk doesn't mean no risk.** It only means that no risk inherent to the code's design has been identified. Other kind of risks could still be present. For example, the issues not fixed incur risks for the users, or the upgradability of the code might also incur risks for the users.

Issue: A behavior unexpected by the users or by the project, or a practice that increases the chances of unexpected behaviors to appear.

Critical issue: An issue intolerable for the users or the project, that must be addressed.

Major issue: An issue undesirable for the users or the project, that we strongly recommend to address.

Medium issue: An issue uncomfortable for the users or the project, that we recommend to address.

Minor issue: An issue imperceptible for the users or the project, that we advise to address for the overall project security.

Objective

Our objective is to share everything we have found that would help assessing and improving the safety of the code:

1. The **inherent risks** of the code, labelled R1, R2, etc.
2. The **issues** in the **code**, labelled C1, C2, etc.
3. The **issues** in the **testing** of the code, labelled T1, T2, etc.
4. The **issues** in the **other** parts related to the code, labelled O1, O2, etc.
5. The **recommendations** to address each issue.

Audit Summary

Initial scope

- **Repository:** <https://github.com/HatomProtocol/hatom-ush-minter>
- **Commit:** e49256c9acc72236f4beb34fde6c258fd1acc0c9
- **MultiversX smart contract path:** ./ush-minter/

Final scope

- **Repository:** <https://github.com/HatomProtocol/hatom-ush-minter>
- **Commit:** 8d32b272639261f7bf035d4e4a60fd50027ae998
- **MultiversX smart contract path:** ./ush-minter/

1 inherent risk in the final scope

0 issue in the final scope

3 issues reported in the initial scope and 0 remaining in the final scope:

Severity	Reported			Remaining		
	Code	Test	Other	Code	Test	Other
Critical	0	0	0	0	0	0
Major	0	0	0	0	0	0
Medium	0	1	0	0	0	0
Minor	2	0	0	0	0	0

Inherent Risks

R1: 1 USH might not be backed by assets with value superior to 1 dollar.

This is because the Hatom team can at anytime whitelist accounts named "facilitators" and set maximal USH minting cap for each facilitator. Those facilitators can make the USH Minter mint USH up to this maximal cap. However, the USH Minter doesn't verify that the facilitator holds enough collateral to back the USH minted.

In principle, the Hatom team should only whitelist facilitators that should hold enough collateral to back the USH they make the USH Minter mint, but there is no such guarantee.

Code Issues & Recommendations

Since the code is not open-source, only the remaining issues are published.

Test Issues & Recommendations

Since the code is not open-source, only the remaining issues are published.

